Why To Exist Is Not What Markus Gabriel Says It Is

Abstract

Markus Gabriel’s view on existence has sparked an ongoing debate within the more continentally orientated philosophical community. To start off, I try to help a more analytically orientated audience to understand what Gabriel actually says about existence. It will be shown that it is easier for an analytic philosopher to grasp what is new about his position if his view is compared to current theories of existence, which feature prominently within the analytic tradition. In a second step, I argue that there is an important reason to reject Gabriel’s view which has not received sufficient attention yet. His view on what it is for an object to exist implies a certain view on what it is for an object not to exist. However, the latter theory cannot make sense of the contrast between existing and non-existing objects, for example, the contrast between actual and fictional objects. Consequently, there is a weighty reason to believe that to exist is not what Gabriel says it is and to prefer a view on existence which can make sense of this contrast.